The calamitous Rana Plaza factory collapse in 2013 focused international attention on labour rights' violations and factory safety in Bangladesh's dominant ready-made garment industry which is almost wholly dependent on exports to the EU. In response, the EU and the ILO launched the Bangladesh Sustainability Compact, with the core objective of promoting continuous improvement in labour rights and factory safety in the industry.
INTRODUCTION
The European Commission once posed the rhetorical question, 'it is surely unacceptable for the international community to turn a blind eye to human rights violations in the name of trade liberalisation?'
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a. Experimentalist Spillover
The EU's pursuit of experimentalist governance within its external relations is represented by the term 'experimentalist spillover'. In the field of labour law, experimentalist spillover has occurred as the EU adopts increasingly novel methods to develop and implement laws, 31 involving both public and private actors, including the social partners -trade unions and employers' organisations -in the design of laws and policies. 32 Experimentalist spillover also aligns with 'normative spillover' 33 as the EU externalises human rights protection and norms, including sustainable development, worldwide. These varying concepts of spillover stem from neofunctionalism, a theory put forward to explain the European integration process whereby integration in one policy area will lead rapidly to integration in other policy areas. 34 As such, as the thrust of integration creates a domino effect as governance tools adopted internally are pursued externally. This endorses GXG as an effective mechanism for the EU to promote its standards as a 'normative actor'.
b. Experimentalist Governance as supported within EU External Relations Law and Policy
The endorsement of experimentalist governance as a mechanism of governance within the EU's acquis is evident. Ambitions of multilateralism and engagement with actors beyond traditional 'commandand-control-type' governmental institutions are mandated within Article 21(1) TEU on the principles of external action. With a domineering tone, this provision states that the EU 'shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations' 36 which share principles pertaining to, inter alia, 'the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms'. It bolsters the founding of the Union on 'respect for human rights' (Article 2 TEU) and its mandate to uphold and protect its values, including sustainable development (Article 21(2) TEU), in its relations with the 'wider world' (Article 3(5) TEU). This mandate is generated from Articles 207(1) and 208(1) TFEU pertaining, respectively, to the Common Commercial Policy and Development Cooperation, which underpin Union policies in these areas with 31 The concept can also be applied to other areas of external EU experimentalist governance. 32 This article has been published in a revised form in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies https://doi.org/10.1017/cel.2017.3. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge 6 human rights values. Human rights are deemed the 'silver thread' that runs through EU external action. 37 Discernibly, the Union is a 'staunch defender' of human rights both internally and externally. 38 Labour rights falling within the broad domain of economic, social and cultural rights are put, at least notionally, on the same footing as civil and political rights under the EU's Charter of Fundamental
Rights. However, despite its normative ambitions as a human rights defender, the Union lacks policies that are consistent and coherent in the field of trade and labour rights. 39 Yet, as there is the scope for norm transfer as the EU conducts trade, 40 it is a potentially lucrative field through which to promote labour rights rooted in ILO obligations shared with partner countries.
Trade and labour rights became a focus for the EU in the 1990s after the failure, at WTO level, to integrate international trade and labour standards. 41 In turn, this led the EU to design an 'ambitious' agenda for promoting labour rights through trade. 42 This agenda rejects protectionist or sanctionbased approaches, which might lead to disputes before the WTO, in favour of the pursuit of integrated, multi-disciplinary methods. 43 The EU seeks to promote incentive, dialogue and cooperation-based approaches to fostering labour rights, incorporating civil society, including domestic and international social partners. 44 Through this inclusive method, the EU aims to act broadly by collective means, 45 facilitating social dialogue, 46 and supporting regular review of progress towards set targets, and promoting feedback and learning. 47 The EU also conducts a significant proportion of external activities within multilateral global governance fora. 48 
c. The EU-ILO Relationship
Fundamentally, the EU-ILO relationship is intrinsic to any policy approach that is focused on improving labour rights in countries which, as ILO members, are signatories of the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and committed to ratification of core ILO conventions. 49 The relationship between the EU and the ILO is not an asymmetric one. 50 The EU supports the ILO internally, by encouraging its Member States to ratify ILO conventions and approve recommendations, and externally through policy and normative measures. 51 From 2004 the relationship has deepened, out of a shared desire to promote the social dimension of globalisation, through the establishment of a 'strategic partnership' under which the EU plays a lead role in promoting the ILO programme for 'decent work' through joint development cooperation initiatives. 52 The concept of decent work encompasses job creation, rights at work, social protection and social dialogue, with gender equality as a crosscutting objective. 53 Decent work now forms part of Goal 8 of the UN's 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. Decent work is, however, 'merely a singular thread among a complex web of issues that provide the dynamic of EU international relations', 54 making it even more important that labour rights are strengthened not by the EU acting alone but rather through mutually reinforcing EU-ILO strategies. 55 The ILO is 'exceedingly relevant' for ensuring that the Union's normative goals are consistent with international obligations.
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Support for ILO norms now forms a core element of EU trade policy and instruments. The EU's capacity to act normatively comes from supporting international labour law as opposed to transnationally exporting its internal labour law, the direct impact of which on third countries is limited, 57 and would, if attempted, be subject to strong resistance. Thus, the standards set by the ILO represent a source of normative power for the EU when applying its trade leverage. 58 The Conventions set what the standard should be and ratification shows a commitment to achieve it. 59 In summary, the EU's promotion of labour rights reflects the concept of 'ILO-isation', which comprises an increasing emphasis on the ILO's role in setting and monitoring labour standards, a shift towards soft governance, and a growing responsibility for the private sector in applying principles in ILO Conventions. 60 The EU-ILO relationship, therefore, is a centrifuge around within which support for GXG is spun. This article has been published in a revised form in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies https://doi.org/10.1017/cel.2017.3. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge 10 normative goals. The Bangladesh Sustainability Compact is the epitome of EU GXG and is a suitable case for analysis.
IV. A CASE STUDY OF GLOBAL EXPERIMENTALIST EU GOVERNANCE
a. Labour rights' issues in the Ready Made Garment Sector in Bangladesh -the case for EU external governance
In this case study we have selected labour rights' issues in the RMG industry in Bangladesh because of the intense interaction between trade, development and human rights issues focused on a specific sector in a country which is economically dependent upon exports to the EU's single market. 81 The EU, therefore, has considerable leverage, through its external governance instruments and processes, to influence policy and practice on the ground to facilitate improvements in labour conditions.
The case for the exercise of global EU governance in the field of labour rights in Bangladesh is threefold. Firstly, with 47 million out of 161 million people living in poverty, 82 Bangladesh is a priority for the EU in its development cooperation, 83 as it seeks to contribute to the eradication of global poverty and the fulfilment of the SDGs by 2030. 84 Bangladesh is a long-standing development partner of the EU, and has faced the evolution of EU policy from being first a 'donor' and now a partner with Government and civil society focused on development needs, governance and human rights. 85 Under the EU's Agenda for Change, the Union seeks to tailor its development partnerships so as to achieve the greatest 'impact' towards eradicating poverty, or aid effectiveness, 86 supporting the twin objectives of: promoting human rights and democracy, and other elements of good governance; and attaining inclusive and sustainable growth for human development. 87 Aid effectiveness has improved under partnership and cooperation agreements, modernised financial instruments and mechanisms designed to improve policy coherence for development. This article has been published in a revised form in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies https://doi.org/10.1017/cel.2017.3. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. Over the last 25 years Bangladesh has rapidly expanded its RMG industry to meet the ever-growing demands of global brands seeking high quality and low cost through their 'global value chains'
(GVCs), 106 to provide cheap clothes to predominantly European consumers mainly using local subcontractors. 107 As such, the RMG industry is part of a complex global jigsaw and provides a fascinating study of the impact of globalisation on both workers and consumers. GVCs make it particularly difficult for countries focused on one export industry at the lower end of the value chain, such as Bangladesh, to escape from a cycle of dependency on low-cost labour and low skills. 108 However, with the RMG industry as an economic and social driver, Bangladesh has been transformed, meeting several of the MDG 2015 targets for, inter alia, cutting extreme poverty and hunger and achieving almost universal primary education. 109 It has fuelled economic growth of 6% per annum over the last decade. 110 The sector employs 4 million workers, 111 approximately 85% of whom are women. 112 Evidence points to increasing school enrolment, decreasing child marriage rates and more financial independence for women. 113 Yet much more needs to be done to empower women and combat exploitative practices.
114
The rapid growth of the industry has been a 'double-edged sword' for RMG workers, 115 enabling employers to exploit the country's comparative advantage in global trade by maintaining the second lowest wages among its competitors. 116 Indeed, the RMG sector in Bangladesh is characterised
This article has been published in a revised form in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies https://doi.org/10.1017/cel.2017.3. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge 13 by long working hours, short and infrequent rest breaks, low wages, job insecurity, gender inequality and child labour. 117 Freedom of association and a lack of collective bargaining rights are of particular concern. Only 10% of the 4,500 garment factories in Bangladesh have registered unions, 118 and the law mandates excessive registration procedures. 119 An ILO high-level tripartite mission highlighted that unions may be 'fake, paper-based, organised without workers' support, initiated by employers or dissolved'. 120 The right to form trade unions is further supressed by harassment and abuse faced by union members from factory owners, women being particularly vulnerable. 121 Rapid growth has also encouraged speedy construction of factories, often without permits, 122 leading to poor labour conditions, overcrowding, and exposure to noise and dangerous machinery.
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Factories may also be constructed with extra floors illegally added, as in the case of Rana Plaza, 124 or have been adapted from residential buildings. 125 Many workers lack sufficient training in essential health and safety understanding. 126 Factory owners face competitive pressure to keep costs low, which further undermines their 'ability to invest in safety'. 
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'Staying engaged' was both a pragmatic and economic choice for the EU, 141 given the importance of the RMG industry for European firms, but it was also in line with ILO thinking, to 'stay with Bangladesh' so as to protect the millions of jobs that depend on the sector. 142 Together, the EU and ILO would use their leverage to send a message to the Government of Bangladesh, the domestic garment manufacturers and the global brands that change was needed to prevent any further disasters. The Compact covers three specific areas, each of which has a strong human rights dimension:
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 respect for labour rights, in particular freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining;  structural integrity of buildings and occupational health and safety; and  responsible business conduct by all stakeholders.
We have analysed progress on the commitments made by the partners in each of these areas in depth in our report for the FRAME project. 144 Our conclusions can be summarised as follows. This article has been published in a revised form in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies https://doi.org/10.1017/cel.2017.3. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge 16 legislative environment. The Bangladesh Labour Act was revised in 2013, bringing some improvements in relation to freedom of association, collective bargaining and workplace safety. 145 The implementing rules for the Act were issued in 2015, providing guidance on central elements of the law. However, this legislation falls short of ILO standards. 146 In our findings, we also identify the need for greater attention to be given to the issue of gender equality as part of the review process.
Lack of freedom of association remains a significant problem. The EU, on the recommendation of the ILO supervisory bodies, has urged the Bangladeshi authorities to speed up registrations of trade unions and end arbitrary non-registration. 147 The global unions have reported that a 'severe climate of anti-union violence prevails' often directed by factory managers and rarely investigated. 148 The ILO is also placing increasing pressure on Bangladesh. In June 2015, the Committee on the Application of Standards demanded: firstly, strengthening of the legislation in relation to freedom of association and collective bargaining; secondly, extending full freedom of association to the 400,000 workers in Technical Status Report notes 'tangible improvements' in enhancing building and workplace safety.
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All factories identified as 'export-orientated' have been inspected and followed up. 152 As the ILO has noted, the completion of the factory inspections is an 'important step' towards improving safety in the sector but 'no factory can be considered safe until it has successfully undergone a remediation process'. 153 It is in securing this essential objective that the Compact has a particular role, through engagement, in urging remediation of faults in factories. 154 The major barrier here is the cost of remediation. Again, the EU has a role, as the lead development partner alongside the Member States, working also with the US and Canada, to assist. In total US$200 million has been pledged but more will be needed. 155 The next period of remediation will be the true test because, without it, many workers will be at risk of injury or death on a daily basis, with the risk of fire remaining particularly acute.
The third pillar of responsible business conduct (RBC) does not establish any commitments upon Bangladesh or the EU. It merely takes note of the private sector response to Rana Plaza and encourages its progression. 156 Therefore, it places emphasis on the EU's support for the Accord, the Alliance and further initiatives through RBC. The essence of the pillar is that Bangladesh and the EU remain 'engaged to support and promote socially responsible supply chains'. 157 It is not about the EU regulating these supply chains, but about supporting RBC.
There are several points to note. Firstly, the EU, the ILO, and the international trade unions are highly critical of the inadequate progress made by Bangladesh towards adopting and implementing reforms of its labour law. Secondly, Bangladesh, the EU and the ILO welcome the efforts by major fashion and retail brands to improve safety in RMG factories. Thirdly, they support the Alliance, to a certain extent, but particularly the Accord, which is the optimum private initiative in partnership with global unions, national unions and other stakeholders. 158 Fourthly, the EU and Bangladesh recognise the need for transnational enterprises/brands/retailers to deepen discussion on RBC and encourage retailers and brands to adopt and follow a unified code of conduct for factory audit. Fifthly, they are seeking to ensure a fuller role for the social partners in the RBC process. This article has been published in a revised form in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies https://doi.org/10.1017/cel.2017.3. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge
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The core tenets of GXG can be applied to the Compact. Firstly, there was an initial reflection and discussion among stakeholders with a broadly shared perception of a common problem. 160 After the tragedy of Rana Plaza, international stakeholders involved in the RMG industry were reproached for their laxity in allowing labour rights violations to prevail. They were directed to repair their 'wrongs'. In a pressured environment, where consumers worldwide were pushing for change, international actors took different paths to achieving the objective of improving labour rights and factory safety. The US, as mentioned above, withdrew its GSP shortly after the disaster, although this was somewhat superficial as the RMG sector had not been given a tariff preference. 161 Brands and retailers scrambled to conclude the Accord and the Alliance. The EU and the ILO emphasised the importance of 'deep engagement' in Bangladesh for all actors involved in the global value chain. 162 The concept of 'deep engagement' was seized upon to quell uncertainty about whether the EU would initiate the GSP withdrawal procedure. Ultimately, the EU, concerned about the impact on workers on the ground, and with the support of the ILO and, to a qualified extent, the international trade unions,
was not willing to withdraw the GSP tariff preferences granted to RMG exports from Bangladesh and chose to reject this path, at least for the immediate term.
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The broadly desired outcome, in theory, of the international community, was a shared endeavour to secure rapid improvement in labour rights and factory safety in Bangladesh. 164 Although, it must be noted that a genuine desire to bring about such change was propelled by a combination of concerns including, inter alia, the loss of business, the political friction that ensued after Rana Plaza, and the sheer scale of the disaster. The predominant difficulty in pursuing such goals was that the actors did not know the best path to take, 165 evident in large part from their diverse responses. It was a situation of strategic uncertainty that meant effective solutions to problems could only be defined by actually pursuing them. 166 The EU understood that it was in a position both of leadership and of a certain special responsibility, as the principal recipient of Bangladesh's RMG exports. 167 Its emphasis on deep engagement manifested itself in a meeting, in July 2013, that brought together representatives from the industry, employers, trade unions and other key stakeholders to discuss the best mechanism with which to address the improvement of labour standards, factory safety and responsible business conduct in the industry. 168 The outcome of this meeting was the Compact driven by the EU in partnership with the ILO, and agreed to by the Government of Bangladesh, initially as a reactive rather than a proactive initiative. 169 It manifested the paramount objective of all the actors involved to foster the continuous improvement of labour rights and factory safety so as to ensure that there would be no more Rana Plazas.
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The establishment of the Compact in response to Rana Plaza adopted and merged together four different 'pathways' to a transnational experimentalist regime discussed by Zeitlin and
Overdevest. 171 First, private transnational initiatives were created in response to, in part, inaction by the Government on labour rights' issues, regimes which were diffused throughout the RMG GVC.
Second, the unilateral imposition of GSP conditions on labour rights moulded itself into a joint governance system with stakeholders from Bangladesh and the RMG industry. Third, the plethora of regimes imposing separate demands upon labour standards in Bangladesh were met by a need for coordination, and, fourth, there was a degree of benchmarking and comparison of different initiatives concluded post-Rana Plaza.
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The Compact also meets the second tenet of GXG by operating as a framework with openended goals. 173 Linguistically, a 'framework' indicates the existence of a supporting or underlying structure. 174 As such a framework, it does not set out how the signatory partners to the Compact should act, but rather acts as a support to their efforts. The Compact becomes the foundation to their deployed methods to achieve the overarching goal. This is particularly reflected by the lexicon used within the Compact, including 'welcome the support', 'take note of the work', 'encourage', 'recognise'
and 'consulting closely'. Thus, the EU's actions and decisions are not imposed upon the Compact partners, it is instead about establishing and fostering a consistent and long-term relationship between them. This
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regarding its development cooperation priorities. Yet even these commitments do not belie the Compact's flexible nature. The Compact acts as an overarching initiative with a cross-cutting coordinating mechanism, 178 adding to the work of trade unions, industry, the ILO and the Government in finding solutions. 179 It was not designed to be the EU 'preaching from a lofty pedestal' but 'rather offering advice'.
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Addressing the third tenet of GXG, the implementation of the goals is left to 'lower-level' or contextually situated actors with knowledge of local conditions and the discretion to adapt the framework norms to the different contexts. 181 The nature of the commitments and goals of the Compact endow the methods by which these goals can be met upon the partners. Much like the EU Member States, as 'lower-level' actors are given the freedom to pursue goals in conventional experimentalist governance, so the Compact partners, including the government, are given some flexibility in the way they pursue its goals. 182 The EU's most important partner in this respect is the Government, as it has the potential to 'work the levers' of law and policy in response to Rana Plaza.
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Genuine experimentalist governance in the field of trade and labour rights also necessarily demands engagement and cooperation with grassroots trade union and employer organisations.
Indeed, experimentalist governance is founded within EU engagement with domestic civil society. and feedback on the situation on the ground, such as highlighting concerns relating to anti-union discrimination and violence. 186 They have played a crucial role in drawing attention to human rights violations in the RMG industry. 187 They also act as a pressure valve on the Government to improve labour rights and provide incentives for them to introduce regulatory reforms. 188 This This article has been published in a revised form in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies https://doi.org/10.1017/cel.2017.3. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge 23 with which Bangladesh treats its obligations and also corruption, whereas the private sector Accord and Alliance initiatives both found safety issues with every factory they inspected. 200 Global NGOs are keen to draw upon the Accord because of the unprecedented role it endows upon trade unions. 201 The private sector has, moreover, been particularly proactive in engaging in peer review. There is a regular forum meeting bringing together all interested brands and retailers to discuss issues related to RBC, 202 and a data sharing facility. 203 The comparisons drawn upon in these meetings generate assessments of the success of the initiatives, which in turn feeds into public accountability, recursive learning and external pressure for improvement, particularly by NGOs both within Bangladesh and worldwide. This article has been published in a revised form in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies https://doi.org/10.1017/cel.2017.3. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge
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Efforts to improve factory safety have resulted in varying degrees of commitments by Compact partners. The weaknesses of the NTPA were identified and addressed by the injection of a US $31.4 million, three and a half year ILO programme funded by Canada, the Netherlands and the UK. 219 The ILO developed hundreds of Corrective Action Plans (CAPs) for NTPA factories in the remediation stage. 220 With regards to difficulties obtaining funding for remediation, development partners including the EU pledged US $200 million, 221 the US having also pledged funding to strengthen Bangladesh's inspectorate process through increasing the number of inspectors. 222 It has only been through extensive peer review and monitoring, and a shared commitment from the partners, that these weaknesses have been able to be addressed and quickly acted upon.
A further feature of the Compact that aligns itself with GXG is the existence of a 'penalty default'. Indeed, experimentalist governance does not preclude the existence of binding legal obligations or sanctions for aspects of non-engagement. 223 This supports the 'hybridity thesis' which approaches the co-existence of law and 'experimentalist governance'. 224 It affiliates with the hypothesis that this coexistence can produce a fruitful outcome. As part of this co-existence, 'default hybridity', governance 'in the shadow of the law' is applicable to the Compact. Hard law is the default regime which can be applied where there has been a lack of engagement in experimentalist governance. Such a default position is potentially severe in its consequences, and is designed to be an 'action-forcing' regime. 225 GXG is deemed to be unsuccessful where it is impossible to have the existence of this penalty default. 226 The penalty default underpinning the Compact is the possibility of GSP tariff preference withdrawal. The Compact is thus a novel form of regulation that can interact with negative conditionality.
However, tariff preference withdrawal is not such a strong 'penalty default'. The Commission shows a policy preference for cooperation over sanctions, and sanctions in the form of tariff preference withdrawal have rarely been enacted by the EU. 227 Negative conditionality may no longer be considered a credible threat underpinning the Compact. This has led to calls for the EU to use its power and leverage more fully to influence the improvement of labour rights and factory safety. 228 Even in the light of ongoing labour rights' violations in Bangladesh, the EU remains cautious about moving to This article has been published in a revised form in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies https://doi.org/10.1017/cel.2017.3. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. International Labour Conference, the ILO Committee on the Application of Standards inserted a special paragraph into its report, noting 'with deep concern that the Government has failed to make progress on the repeated and consistent conclusions of this Committee'. 231 It urged the government to undertake several actions, including amending the 2013 Labour Act, investigating acts of anti-union discrimination and ensuring the appropriate procedures are in place for union registrations.
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Global trade unions are confident that the initiation of an investigation process is the appropriate path for the EU to take. 233 They consider that it is time for the EU to take a bolder position and steps to determine whether a partial suspension of trade preferences is in order. 234 Despite this, the EU still has not undertaken a GSP investigation, arguing for more dialogue, which global trade unions view not in itself as problematic, but conclude that 'the manner in which the EU has conducted dialogue has been ineffective given that the situation has only worsened substantially over the last several years'. 235 In March 2017, as progress stalled on the actions recommended by the ILO, it was reported that the Commission sent a joint letter to the Ambassador of Bangladesh in Brussels warning that key labour reforms had to be undertaken or it risked temporary withdrawal of trade preferences. 236 Certainly, the process of peer review of the EU's actions by trade unions, NGOs and the ILO, with regard to the lack of imposition of the 'penalty default' has played a particularly important role under the Compact. In one of the rare instances that GSP withdrawal has occurred, in Myanmar, it was the trade union organisations, utilising their leverage within the ILO, that acted as the conduit for GSP withdrawal. 237 Trade union organisations in response to Rana Plaza, on the other hand, advocated at first the softer approach of the Compact. Now their position as Compact partners has endowed them with greater ongoing influence in the process of GXG.
This weakness in invoking the 'penalty default' scenario is that it provides less incentive for the employers and Government to engage. 238 Staying engaged in the Compact should not be
